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PART-FARM  GENERAL CROPLAND RETIREMENT:
EFFECTS OF SOME ALTERNATIVE
PROGRAM  SPECIFICATIONS
George  D.  Irwin, Jerry A. Sharpies, and John H. Berry*
The  impact  of technological  advance  in  reducing  and  force  the  bulk  of adjustments  onto  particular
the  need  for  agricultural  land has  been more or less  regions, commodity groups, or types of farms.
recognized  since  at least  the  early  1950s.  After  ex-
periments  with  general  cropland  retirement  in  the  THE RESEARCH MODEL
1956-60  Conservation  Reserve  Program,  U.  S.  farm
policy  turned  to  annual  acreage  adjustments,  com-  Other  studies  have  examined  general  cropland
modity  by  commodity.  Now  farm policy  proposals  'retirement  at  a  national  and  regional  level  [2,  3, 4,
once  again  include  the  general  cropland  retirement  6].  Our  objective  was  to  see  if  additional  insight
approach,  either  alone  or in combination with annual  could  be  gained  by  taking  an  intensive  look at  the
commodity programs.  problem at a more micro-level.
Three  general  ways  have  evolved  for  obtaining  In  using  the  linear  programming  approach  with
acreage  reductions:  (1) diverting land from individual  some  of its  inherent  advantage  for  part-farm  adjust-
crops,  (2)  retiring  parts  of  farms,  and  (3)  retiring  ment  analysis,  comparisons  can  be  made  in  a  con-
whole farms  from crop  production.  Combinations  of  trolled or synthesized  environment,  but in translating
the three have also been considered.  Our topic centers  to  a real  world  environment,  one  must  subjectively
on part-farm  general  cropland  retirement,  alone  and  discount  the  results  for  the  inadequacy  of the opti-
in combination  with annual crop programs  similar to  mizing assumption.
recent feed grain, wheat, and cotton programs.  Linear
programming results  from a recent aggregate  study of  Previous  analyses,  both of participation  in earlier
Indiana farms  helps identify several  principles related  land  retirement  programs  and  of efficient  farm  or-
to  part-farm  general  cropland  retirement  programs  ganizations,  suggest  that  most  programs  encounter
which are relevant on a national scale.  considerable  "slack."  Production is  reduced  less than
one  would  anticipate  from  the  number  of acres  re-
Evaluation  of  land  retirement  proposals  often  tired.  One  reason  is  that  less  productive  land  is
revolves  around  the  triple  objectives  of  (1)  inter-  usually  idled  [5].  A  second reason is that most farms
commodity  and  inter-area  efficiency,  (2)  longrun  have  some  land that is under  utilized,  or which may
land  utilization  at  levels  that  afford  "reasonable"  easily  fit  into  a program  because it  would  otherwise
producer  prices,  and  (3)  handling  temporary  imbal-  be idle for rotation, drainage,  moisture  conservation,
ance  arising  in  weather  and uncontrolled  elements,  or  other  reasons.  This  land  would  be  included  in  a
unforeseen  international  developments,  uneven rates  general  cropland  retirement  program  at  fairly  low
of technological  improvements,  etc.  It  is  sometimes  payment  rates,  but  would  not  result  in  significant
hypothesized  that efficiency and longrun over-surplus  output  reduction.  To  test  this hypothesis,  two  dif-
problems  suggest  the longrun general  cropland retire-  ferent  definitions of land  eligible  for retirement were
ment  approach, and  the temporary imbalance  can be  used. The  first  was all tillable land, including the part
alleviated  with  annual  commodity  programs.  It  is  which would not be row-cropped  in any one year for
imperative  under  the  general  cropland  retirement  soil  conservation  or  other  reasons.  The  second  in-
approach  to  understand  the  interplay  of the  most  cluded  only  the  portion  of  total  cropland  which
significant  parameters  in  order  to  determine  how  could  be row-cropped  in  an  average  year.  They  are
tually,  program  features can easily  get out of balance  tively.  Definitions of the  land  categories  were based
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97on  soil conservation  needs data. Each  of the two  re-  were  used,  in  turn,  and the resulting 5 solutions for
tirement  systems  was  studied  first  in  combination  each of the four farm program situations were used to
with present  feed  grain and wheat  programs  (FGW),  develop the analysis.
and  then  under the  assumption  that  there  were  no
annual programs (NO FGW).  FINDINGS
Thus,  four  alternative  sets  of  program  features  The  results  may  be  condensed  under  headings
were  considered.  They  differ  in  (1)  the  method  of  corresponding  to  six  critical  questions  related  to
specifying  land  eligible  for  retirement  (TILL  or  general cropland retirement:
ROW),  and  in  (2)  whether  or not  the  present  feed
grain and wheat programs are assumed in effect (FGW  (1)  How far  out of equilibrium is crop production
or  NO  FGW).  An  area optimizing  model,  including  under  present  programs?  One  needs  to  estimate  an
two sizes of each of two types of farms in each of five  answer to this  question before he can evaluate a farm
areas,  was used to compare  the four  programs under  policy  consisting  only  of  ageneral  cropland  retire-
efficient organization.  ment program.
The  model  was  an adapted version of an analytic  (2)  What  is  the  general  shape  of  the  supply  of
system  developed by Berry to estimate corn, hog, and  retired land function?
beef  supply  functions  for  Indiana  farms  [1].  A
Markov  Chain  analysis  of Census data  projects  num-  (3)  What interralationships  must be considered  in
bers of farms  to  1970. Proportions of grain and  live-  designing  a  general  cropland  retirement  program
stock farms  are  determined  from  a  regression based  either  in  conjunction  with  a  set  of commodity  pro-
on  trends  and  expected  price  ratios.  A  multifirm-  grams or alone?
multiarea  linear  programming  model  finds  a  con-
strained  maximum  net  social product  for  the  State.  (4)  What  are  the impacts of various ways of speci-
Under certain conditions, (i.e.,  when area constraints  fying the land eligible for retirement?
are  binding)  this  yields  a  monopoly  solution  to the
constrained  optimizing  problem,  rather  than  a  per-  (5)  How  are  the  impacts  likely  to  be  felt in dif-
fectly competitive  solution.  Results presented  in this  ferent areas and on different types of farms?
analysis were not  so affected. Prices, costs, and yields
used  were  1966  projections  of  1970  expected  (6)  How  are  the  impacts  altered  by uncertainty
conditions,  except  for  soybeans.  The  soybean  price  about  the  future  price  of soybeans  relative to other
was  $2.  with  $0.92 corn. Further analysis  was made  crops?
to  consider  $2.25  and  $2.50  soybean  prices.  Wheat
price  plus certificate  payment  was the equivalent  of  The questions  apply  equally  to commodity,  part-
$1.80 in  the programs,  and price was $1.30 under no  farm,  and  whole  farm  general  cropland  retirement
program solutions.  programs,  but  we  restrict  our  analysis  to part-farm
programs.  The  results  have  national  implications
Resources  on  grain  and  livestock  farms  with  though  the  research  model  was  specifically  for
100-259  acres and over 260 acres are included in each  Indiana.
of  five  areas  of  the  State  for  a  total  of 20  farm
groups. Using the  1964 Census as a guide, the propor-  Because of space limitations,  much available detail,
tion  of Indiana production derived  from these  farms  used  in  deriving the  conclusions,  has  been  omitted.
would be around 80 percent and would vary by crop.  Profit  maximizing plans  are referred to as "efficient"
This  reaffirms  that  absolute  estimates  were  of  a  herein.
reasonable  size.
Disequilibria in Present Programs
Each farm group  is constrained  in the use of land,
labor,  and  capital  and has  a  range  of crop, hog,  and  Efficient production patterns in  the shortrun with
beef production alternatives.  Hay may be transferred  no  annual  (FGW)  or  general  cropland  retirement
among  farms  in  each  area,  and  at  a  minimum,  the  (GCR)  programs  call  for  two  substantial  changes  in
State must have  no deficit in  feed grains. An upward  cropping  patterns.  The  present  real  world situations
sloping  hired  labor  supply  function  is  specified  for  may,  thus,  be  viewed,  in  part,  as program-induced
the State.  disequilibria.  One  adjustment  would be to place most
of  the  currently  diverted  acres  into  soybeans.  The
In  the  model,  each  farm  could  rent  land  to  the  explanation  of  the  choice  of  soybeans  over  corn,
general  cropland retirement  program up to  a limit of  which  is  normally  considered  the  more  profitable,
30  percent of the land  in each  of the five geographic  will be covered  later.  The other would be a very large
areas.  Rental  rates  of  $0,  $15,  $30,  $45,  and  $60  increase  (3  times) in wheat acreage, with much of the
98production  coming  from  the  portion of total  crop-  change  in payment  rate  has little effect and in others
land.that  must  annually  be in close-grown  crops for  it is quite large.  Cost of.program, response  to it, and
soil  conserving  reasons.  Much  of this  acreage  is  no  incidence  of the  impacts  are,  thus, strongly affected.
longer needed for livestock.
Generally,  the  TILL  land  base  programs  show
These conclusions are, of course,  shortrun, because  more  response  to changing  retirement  payment  rate
they  are  based  on an assumed  set of product  prices.  than  the  ROW  land  base  and  those with  NO  FGW
Some  adjustments  were  made  in  these results under  programs  more  than  those  having  such  competitive
the free market situation, but not enough, perhaps, to  programs.
fully  account  for quantity  effects  on price.  Yet the
net prices used (for wheat, $1.80 price plus certificate  For the TILL base with  FGW,  the curves are elas-
under  programs,  and  $1.30  under free market,  $2 for  tic  in  low  and  high price  ranges with little  response
soybeans,  and $0.92 for corn)  did assume  substantial  between.  The  elasticity  at  low  prices  for retirement
dampening  of  expectations,  and,  or  course,  returns  results  from  picking  up  "slack"  cropland  and  the
would.be  affected.  Without programs,  the gross  out-  elasticity  at  higher  prices  from  bidding  land  away
put  effect  would  be  about  a  30  percent  increase.  from  soybean  production  (Figure  1, part  A,  Curve
There  is some  question  whether  a price of wheat cor-  III). In NO  FGW programs, the low range elasticity  is
responding  to its feed grain value would be favorable  eliminated  because the  "slack"  land can more profit-
enough  to encourage  this sort of acreage shift, though  ably  raise  wheat  (curve  II). Elasticity  occurs instead
the alternatives are not very attractive.  in mid range  as the payments become high enough to
outbid  wheat  and  in  the  high  range  to  outbid  soy-
Supply Functions for Retired Land  beans.
The  most significant  feature  for program  design is  With  the  ROW  base,  "slack"  land  is  defined  as
that  "elasticity"  of the retired land supply  functions  ineligible  for the retirement  program,  so we  get little
varies,  depending  on the  general  level  of retirement  elasticity  in  low  price  ranges.  In  combination  with
payment  assumed.  In  most  cases  the  bulk  of farms  FGW  programs,  response  is  nil  until  the  high price
have  similar curves, though the payment prices which  range,  where  payments  are  competitive with returns
are  the  breaking  point  between  different  kinds  of  from  soybean  production.  In  NO  FGW  programs,
program  response  do differ.  In certain  price ranges, a  wheat  acreage  is larger  and can be attracted to GCR
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0  -*~~~~~~~~~~  0  I~99 99at  somewhat  lower  payment  rates.  Thus,  the curves  conclusion  suggests  the need for  careful verification.
show substantial elasticity  over the range  of payment  It also  suggests  that  analyses  in  other  areas  and  for
levels.  other  crops  may  need  to take  into account  the pos-
sibility  of  complementarity,  especially  when  major
Two significant  summary points can be made:  (1)  program changes are being studied.
Combined  participation  in  FGW  and  GCR is greater
than  in a  GCR alone, but this reflects  an assumption  Defining Eligible  Land Base
in the model of 20 percent mandatory  FGW diversion
in  order  to  study  effects  of the  program, as well as  Choice of the  eligible land  base  is crucial in deter-
somewhat  higher average  payment  rates under  FGW.  mining  influence  on the amount  of output, the  crop
(2) We  can specify  a general order of land uses, based  acreage  reduction, and  the degree  of participation  at
on  increasing  GCR  payments  needed  to attract  land  various  payment  rates.  A TILL base program reduces
(slack, then  wheat, then soybeans, then corn), but, as  output  less,  gets more  acreage participation  at given
will be noted  in the next section, this general pattern  payment  levels,  and  reduces  wheat  production.  A
is  modified  by  several  complementary  relationships.  ROW base  program reduces output more, gets smaller
Thus, simple  crop  budgets cannot provide  a complete  acreage  participation,  reduces  corn  and  soybean
measure of program effects.  acreages,  and  has  no  direct  effect  on wheat  adjust-
ments.  At  minimum  payment  levels,  almost  all
Interrelationships in Program Design  response  to  a  TILL  base  program  is  from otherwise
under  utilized  land.  The  program,  thus,  provides  an
Two  types  of  interaction  were  found  to  affect  income transfer payment with little output effect.
program  results:  (1)  between  current  programs  and
GCR, and (2) among crops in the rotation. Feed grain  With either  kind of land base, combined participa-
and  wheat  programs  play  the  role  of  competitor,  tion in' joint FGW and GCR programs usually exceeds
introducing an  opportunity cost in  addition  to those  participation in the GCR with NO FGW program.  The
provided  by  cropping alternatives,  on obtaining land  difference  is  slight  under the  ROW  land base  at $45
for  GCR.  Thus,  their  presence  at  current  payment  and  $60 annual payment rates since the two programs
levelsl  effectively  places  a minimum price on GCR if  draw  from the  same  land base.  Under the TILL land
it  is  to  get  a  portion of the  land  eligible  for  these  base,  we  find  a  slight complementarity  between the
programs.  In Indiana,  this means that payments need  two  programs.  As  payment  rate  and  participation
to  be  over  $60 per  acre  to  compete  with  the  feed  under  GCR  increase,  participation  in  the  optional
grain  program  for  feed grain land,  over  $45 for  soy-  additional  30 percent  part of the feed  grain program
bean land to compete with market opportunities,  and  also increases.
over $30 for wheat land.
Area and Farm Type Considerations
Among  crops,  soybeans  and  wheat  exhibited  a
surprisingly  strong  complementarity  in  the  model.  Areas  can  be arrayed according  to amount of par-
This  explains the  shift of diverted  feed  grain land to  ticipation  for  any  specified  GCR  payment  level.
soybeans  rather  than  corn  when  programs  were  Those  having  the  least  productive  land  and  the
dropped.  The  complementarity  arose  (1)  because  highest  percentages  required  in  soil conserving  crops
soybeans,  but  not usually  corn,  can  be  removed  in  will  have  the  largest  participation.  In  3  of  the  5
time  for  fall  seeding  of wheat, and (2)  because of a  Indiana  areas,  the  assumed  limit  of  30  percent  of
soil  conserving  impetus  for  close-grown  crops.  Soy-  retired  cropland  could  be  attracted  with  $60  pay-
beans  appear  to  hold  a  much  stronger  competitive  ments.  Conversely,  differential  payment  rates or area
position  against  corn  in  Indiana  than  they  would  limits  are  required  to distribute  participation  among
appear  to  have  by comparing  expected returns  from  areas.
an acre of each. This result suggests that crop comple-
mentarity  cannot  be  completely  ignored,  a  fact  we  Crop  farms  participated  much more  heavily  than
have  tended  to overlook in this age of technologically  livestock  farms,  and  total  output  of meat  was  af-
induced  increasing gains to specialization.  fected  only slightly by variation in the programs. This
reflected  a general  shift  toward non-pasture  livestock
This  possibility  needs  some  further  study.  The  systems. The small and large livestock  farms displayed
model  has built-in  conservation  requirements,  as well  dissimilar  responses to the removal of FGW programs.
as  relative  prices,  yields,  and  costs  which  appear  The  large  farms  decrease  GCR  when  annual  crop
reasonable,  but  the  importance  of  the  tentative  programs  are  removed  in  order  to  concentrate  on
1Feed  grain  diversion  payments  ranged  from  $71.65  to  $82.90  on first  20  percent,  and  from  $57.40  to  $66.51  on
optional up to 50 percent.  Wheat support amounted  to the equivalent of $0.50 certificate per bushel on yields of 40 to 45 bushels
per acre.
100production.  The  smaller  farms generally shifted some  program design for any area:
of the diverted land into GCR (a response also found
on  the  large  grain  farms).  This  suggests  that  the
commodity  programs  have  more disruptive  organiza-  (1)  Joint  programs  create  implicit  opportunity
tional  consequences  for the large  livestock  farms (an  costs for each other.
observation  which  appears  to  be  supported by their
lack of participation in past programs). lack  of  participation  in past programs).  (2)  The  extent of disequilibrium  between current
and  free  market  situations  is  creating  substantial
adjustment  pressure.  This  pressure  emphasizes  the
difficulty  of  managing  any  phaseout  from  present The soybean  price influences  both  the patterns of  o  o  from  present
crop  production  and  the  crop  affected  by  a  GCR 
program.  At  $2 and  $2.25  soybean prices,  there  is a
complementarity  between  corn  production  and  the  (3)  Substantial  quantities of "slack"  land must be
CGR  program.  As  the  retirement  payment  is  in-  considered  in  designing  a program by making allow-
creased  some  land  is  retired  from  wheat  and  soy-  ances in the  cost-control budgets  or by appropriately
beans.  Some  additional  land  is  shifted  from  these  defining eligibility.
crops  to  corn. With  soybeans at  $2.50,  much of-the
effect  came  in  the  form  of reduced  corn  acreage.  (4)  The  type  of  crop  production  retired  in  the
Thus,  the  recent  decrease  in  soybean, price  support  shortrun  will be  directly  related  to the definition of
from  $2.50  to  $2.20  (no.  2  basis) would, if market  land eligible for retirement.
prices adjusted  similarly,  shift the crop  affected by a
GCR program from corn to wheat and soybeans.
(5)  The possibility of crop complementarity  arises
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRAM  DESIGN  as a factor in program design whenever  price relation-
ships  among  crops  are  altered  and  especially  when
The  findings  appear  to  point  up  at  least  five  major  changes  in  long  existing  programs  are  con-
central  relationships  which  must  be  considered  in  sidered.
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